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ARTICLE
RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
DEBATE ON THE PATENTING OF
HUMAN GENES1
AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, PH.D.*
Whether patents or other forms of intellectual property rights should
be granted on living things, particularly human genes, has been debated for
more than thirty years. Opposition has proceeded on two levels: some have
raised utilitarian and consequentialist questions about the implications of
patenting for impeding scientific research and medical applications, and
others, primarily in the religious community, have contested life patents on
the grounds of their conflict with moral and theological principles. While
there has been some public attention on the issue, the “debates” over the
appropriateness and impact of genetic patenting have taken place primarily
among scholars through publications in ethical and legal journals, papers
presented at professional meetings, and panels at academic conferences.
Over time the concerns raised have shifted, but criticism of life patents has
been persistent, albeit coming in intermittent waves.
The religious community has been involved in discussion of the appro-
priateness of patenting human genes from the beginning. In 1980, shortly
after the Supreme Court issued the landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty deci-
sion holding that a genetically modified strain of bacteria was patentable,2
the General Secretaries of the National Council of Churches, the United
States Catholic Conference, and the Synagogue Council of America sent
President Jimmy Carter a letter in which they expressed concerns about the
1. This paper builds upon three previous publications of mine: AUDREY R. CHAPMAN,
UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES: RELIGIOUS ETHICS AT THE FRONTIERS OF GENETIC SCIENCE, (1999)
[hereinafter UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES]; PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC PATENTING: RELIGION,
SCIENCE, AND INDUSTRY IN DIALOGUE (Audrey R. Chapman ed., 1999) [hereinafter
PERSPECTIVES] ; Audrey R. Chapman, The Ethics of Patenting Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 19
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J., 261 (2009).
* Dr. Chapman is a Professor in the Division of Public Health Law and Bioethics at the
University of Connecticut Health Center.
2. 477 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
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patenting of life. The letter stated that the control of life forms by any indi-
vidual group posed a potential threat to all humanity:
We know from experience that it would be naı¨ve and unfair to ask
private corporations to suddenly abandon the profit motive when
it comes to genetic engineering. Private corporations develop and
sell new products to make money, whether these products are au-
tomobiles or new forms of life. Yet when the products are new
life forms, with all the risks entailed, shouldn’t there be broader
criteria than profit for determining their use and distribution?3
Nevertheless, it is important to note two caveats about religious contri-
butions to the debate over the patenting of human genes. First, religious
involvement has been quite sporadic. Periods of activity have been followed
by years of silence regarding these issues. Little has been heard during the
past ten years from representatives of the religious communities previously
interested in the issue or the moral theologians who wrote on the topic.
Importantly, only one denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, sub-
mitted an amicus brief to express its views in the sole litigation on the
permissibility of patenting unmodified human genes. The case, Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, was decided by the Supreme
Court on June 13, 2013.4 Overruling the long-standing position of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, which had granted some 20,000 patents on
isolated and purified genes, all nine justices of the Court held that the seg-
ments of DNA that make up human genes are not patentable subject matter
under section 101 of the Patent Act5 because they are products of nature.6
However, the Court ruled that “complementary DNA,” or cDNA, genetic
sequences created by stripping away non-protein coding material from natu-
rally occurring DNA, are not a product of nature, and therefore are
patentable.7
Second, there is no consensus regarding religious positions on genetic
patenting. Most religious contributors to the debate have presented their
own views rather than representing official denominational positions. More-
over, there have sometimes been stronger and more heated disagreements
within the religious community than between members of the religious and
secular communities. This was certainly the case when I served as the con-
vener of a multi-sector dialogue group under the aegis of the Program of
Dialogue Between Science, Ethics, and Religion of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) that brought together repre-
sentatives of the religious community with scientists, secular ethicists, and
3. Claire Randall, Bernard Mandelbaum & Thomas Kelly, A Letter to the President of the
United States (June 20, 1980), in GENETIC ENGINEERING: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES
app. at 48 (1984) [hereinafter GENETIC ENGINEERING].
4. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
6. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2109.
7. Id. at 2110.
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representatives of industry to discuss the appropriateness and implications
of patenting human genes. Some of the resources referenced in this paper
were written for the dialogue group and published in an edited volume,
Perspectives on Genetic Patenting: Religion, Science, and Industry in
Dialogue.8
This paper identifies the various religious contributions over the years
to the human gene patenting debate and the context in which these views
were presented. It begins with three background sections: the role of law
and ethics in human genetic patenting, opposition to human gene patenting
in the scientific and legal communities, and an overview of the religious
contributions. It then explores five themes on which there have been input
by the religious community: (1) the grounds for opposition to patenting of
life, specifically human genes; (2) the theological implications of patents on
life; (3) the implications of patents for human dignity; (4) the implications
of patenting for the commodification of human life; and (5) the ontological
and metaphysical status of DNA. The final section evaluates the relevance
or lack thereof of the positions taken by the religious community to the
Myriad case.
I. LEGAL AND ETHICAL PROVISIONS IN PATENT LAW
In 1980, the landmark Supreme Court decision, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, overturned some two hundred years of legal doctrine that con-
ceptualized life forms as “products of nature” rather than human inventions
and therefore unable to meet the three criteria for patents established by the
United States Congress and many other countries: novelty, utility, and non-
obviousness.9 As interpreted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), to be “novel” an invention must not have been known and
available to the public at the time of the application.10 “Utility” refers to
usefulness.11 To qualify, a proposed patent must specify a concrete func-
tion, service, or purpose.12 Under the “nonobviousness” standard, it is not
possible to obtain a patent if the differences between its subject matter and
the prior art are such that “the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”13 Until 1980 the
USPTO did not issue patents for living organisms, but only for composi-
8. See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1.
9. 477 U.S. at 311–12.
10. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents
(Nov. 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp.
11. Id. (“Utility patents may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof”).
12. Id.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
2013] RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 653
tions containing living things, such as a waste disposal system containing
bacteria.14
In Chakrabarty the Court ruled, in a narrow five-to-four decision, that
a genetically modified strain of bacteria capable of degrading components
of crude oil and thus useful in cleaning up oil spills was patentable as a new
and useful manufacture or composition of matter.15 Although Ananda
Chakrabarty, a microbiologist then working at General Electric, acknowl-
edged that he used commonplace methods to exchange genetic material be-
tween bacteria, the Court held that “his discovery is not nature’s handiwork
but his own” and “the result of human ingenuity and research.”16 While the
decision affirmed that phenomena of nature in their natural state are not
patentable, the Court identified a major exception: goods that have been
transformed from their natural state through human intervention may be
patented. According to the Court, Congress intended that “anything under
the sun that is made by man” be patentable subject matter.17 The courts
have continued to affirm, most recently in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Labs, that “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas are not patentable.”18 After the Chakrabarty decision the USPTO,
followed by the European and Japanese patent offices, began to grant new
kinds of biotechnology patents. New kinds of biotechnology patents in-
cluded patents on new plant varieties, non-naturally occurring non-human
multicellular living organisms, including animals, such as a mouse geneti-
cally altered so as to be susceptible to breast cancer, and eventually, discov-
eries of naturally occurring human genetic sequences.19
To justify patenting unmodified human genes, the USPTO had to rein-
terpret its criteria for patenting. However it did not provide a full legal justi-
fication for granting human gene patents until January 2001, when it issued
its Utility Examination Guidelines (Guidelines).20 The Guidelines justify
patents on isolated DNA by claiming that the raw DNA, whether the whole
of a gene or a fragment, becomes a new composition of matter when it is
chemically isolated from its natural state and purified.21 In the Guidelines
the USPTO argues that a DNA molecule that has been isolated in this man-
ner is not a product of nature.22 Even under the USPTO’s reinterpretation, a
2005 evaluation of some 1167 claims contained within seventy-four issued
14. UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES, supra note 1, at 132.
15. 477 U.S. at 310–11.
16. Id. at 310, 313.
17. Id.
18. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
19. See Mark Sagoff, DNA Patents: Making Ends Meet, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at
245; Mark Sagoff, Report, Animals as Inventions: Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights,
INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y 16, 18 (1996).
20. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
21. Id. at 1093.
22. Id.
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patents covering human genetic material found that thirty-eight percent did
not meet the then current interpretation of existing statutory requirements
under U.S. law.23
Two developments accelerated the subsequent patenting of genes in
this country. The Bayh-Dole Act, adopted in 1980, encouraged the commer-
cialization of federally supported research, including biotechnology, and to
that end permitted recipients of federal funding to apply for intellectual
property rights for their inventions.24 The inception of the Human Genome
Project (HGP) in 1988, a major international initiative to decode the human
genome led by the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH), accel-
erated the pace of genetic discoveries and raised anew the issues related to
commercialization of biology. In 1991, well before any of the significant
issues regarding intellectual property rights or applications of research and
discoveries funded through the HGP were resolved, NIH filed a patent ap-
plication on 350 human gene fragments that had been identified by one of
its scientists, followed by a second patent application in 1992 on an addi-
tional 2370 fragments.25 The USPTO turned down NIH’s initial patent ap-
plication on the grounds that gene fragments did not meet the criteria for
patenting, but later reversed its policy.26 In 2005 it was estimated that about
one-fifth of human gene sequences were patented.27 Genes associated with
health and specific diseases are more likely to be patented than other
genes.28 More recently however, a new study found that forty-one percent
of the genes in the human genome have been claimed.29 If both short and
long nucleotide sequences are considered, the study concluded that the en-
tire human genome may be covered by patents held by commercial
companies.30
Despite the ethical concerns about the appropriateness of patenting life
forms, from the years after the Chakrabarty decision to the present day,
Congress has refrained from taking up the issue and setting policy. The lack
of legislative guidelines left the USPTO free to determine policy on narrow
technical grounds. Baruch Brody’s review of the development of intellec-
tual property norms applied to biotechnology in the United States offers
23. Jordan Paradise, et al., Patents on Human Genes: An Analysis of Scope and Claims, 307
SCIENCE 1566, 1566–67 (2005).
24. The Bayh-Dole Act, or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. 96-517
(Dec. 12 1980).
25. Pamela Zurer, NIH Files Second Human Gene Patent Application, Chem. Eng. News
(Feb. 17, 1992) at 6, http://pubs.acs.org/stoken/campaign/watchglass/pdf/10.1021/cen-v070n007.
p006.
26. See John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE, 689, 689–90 (1998).
27. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,
310 SCIENCE 239, 239–40 (2005).
28. Id.
29. Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher Mason, Pervasive Sequence Patents Cover the Entire
Human Genome, GENOME MED., 3 (Mar. 25, 2013), http://genomemedicine.com/content/5/3/27.
30. Id.
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extensive evidence that there were many opportunities, all missed, to mod-
ify the traditionally robust system of intellectual property rights to make it
more appropriate for living and naturally occurring products.31 Nor did the
courts or Congress clarify or systematically resolve a series of important
issues as they emerged, instead, leaving the patenting landscape to incre-
mental shaping through litigation. As noted, on the central issue of how
much change from what is found in nature is required for a product to be
patentable, the USPTO and the courts came to accept the view that the
isolation and purification of what occurs naturally is sufficient to make the
product patentable.32 Congress and the courts also neglected to consider
imposing special conditions on the use of genetic material from a particular
individual or group of people, for example, to require low-cost licensing
when access was important for human welfare.33
In this country, ethical concerns are not usually seen as relevant to the
development of intellectual policy norms. Only once has the USPTO re-
jected a life patent claim primarily on ethical grounds.34 To bring attention
to questions concerning the ethics of genetic engineering and patenting of
engineered life forms, two opponents of human gene patents, Stuart New-
man and Jeremy Rifkin, filed a patent application in December 1997 for
creating human-animal chimeras that could be up to fifty percent human
and implanting them into surrogate mothers.35 The patent was rejected by
the USPTO in part because “the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claimed invention as a whole embraces a human being.”36 Presumably this
ruling reflected the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against owning an-
other person. Following the filing of the chimera patent application, the
USPTO also issued an advisory indicating “that inventions directed to
human/non-human chimeras could, under certain circumstances, not be pat-
entable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the public
policy and morality aspects of the utility requirements.”37
31. The review was published as a two part article in the March and June issues of the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal: Baruch Brody, Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The
U.S. Internal Experience (pts. 1 & 2), 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1 (Mar. 2006), 16 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 105 (June 2006).
32. Baruch Brody, Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The U.S. Internal Experience –
Part I, 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 11 (Mar. 2006).
33. Id. at 15–19.
34. See Sander Rabin, The Human Use of Humanoid Beings: Chimeras and Patent Law, 24
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 5 (May 2006).
35. Rochelle K. Seide & Carmella L. Stephens, Ethical Issues and Applications of Patent
Laws in Biotechnology, in WHO OWNS LIFE? 59, 67 (David Magnus, Arthur Caplan, Glenn Mc-
Gee eds., 2002).
36. Id.
37. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 13–21 [hereinafter Direc-
tive 98/44/EC].
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In contrast with the situation in this country, European patent law in-
corporates ethical screens that have discouraged forms of life patenting. Ar-
ticle 53 of the European Patent Convention on exceptions to patentability
stipulates that European patents shall not be granted for “inventions the
publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or
morality.”38 The exemption language in the European Patent Convention is
also incorporated into the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Building on
the precedent of the European Patent Convention, TRIPS allows members
to exclude subject matter from patenting “to protect ordre public or moral-
ity, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment.”39 Although the United States is a
member of TRIPS, this provision has not been applied in U.S. courts.
In addition, the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnology
Inventions (Directive), approved by the European Parliament in 1998, has a
series of exclusions applying to life. In contrast to the absence of restric-
tions in the policy of the United States, the Directive excludes plant and
animal varieties from patenting along with essential biological processes for
the production of plants or animals.40 Article 5 of the Directive has addi-
tional exclusions relating to the human body, including human genes:
• The human body, at the various stages of its formation and
development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements,
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot
constitute patentable inventions.41
• The industrial application42 of a sequence or partial sequence
of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application.43
Repeating the language in the European Patent Convention, the Direc-
tive also specifies that inventions shall be considered nonpatentable where
their commercial exploitation would be contrary to public order or moral-
ity,44 and identifies the following list as examples:
(a) Processes for cloning human beings;
(b) Processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of
human beings;
(c) Uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes;
38. European Patent Convention, Article 53(a) (Jan. 24, 2011).
39. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S., Annex 1C, sec-
tion 5, art. 27(2) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
40. Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 37, at art. 4(1) a & b.
41. Id. at art. 5(1).
42. European patent criteria uses the term industrial application, which is equivalent to the
U.S. criteria of usefulness and is stricter about its assessment in evaluations of patentability.
43. Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 37, at art. 5(3).
44. Id. at art. 6(1).
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(d) Processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which
are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical
benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such
processes.45
Although the Directive was addressed only to European Union mem-
ber states, obliging them to amend their national biotech patent laws to be
consistent with its provisions, the European Patent Office, which is inde-
pendent of the European Union, voluntarily incorporated the Directive’s
rules into its implementing regulations. Article 6(2)c and its moral exclu-
sions became rule 23d(c) of the European Patent Convention.46 Signifi-
cantly, in 2011, the European Court of Justice, when considering a German
patent awarded to neuroscientist Oliver Bru¨stle, ruled that processes and
products involving human embryonic stem cells are not patentable in
Europe.47
II. OPPOSITION TO GENETIC PATENTING FROM THE SCIENTIFIC AND
LEGAL COMMUNITIES
Historically, intellectual property regimes evolved to balance the moral
and economic rights of creators and inventors with the wider interests and
needs of society. A major justification for patents and copyrights is that
incentives and rewards to inventors result in benefits for society. The U.S.
Constitution, written in 1787, for example, vests the Congress with the
power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.”48 Similarly, TRIPS provides the following
rationale for intellectual property:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.49
But somewhere along the way, the instrumental character of intellec-
tual property as a means to promote the public good has been lost. In the
post-industrial information society, intellectual property has come to be
seen as an economic asset in much the same way as material investments
once were. In the process, intellectual property has become more a means to
45. Id. at art. 6(2).
46. Gerard Porter et al., The Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells in Europe, 24
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 653, 653 (2006).
47. Gretchen Vogel, Dismay, Confusion Greet Human Stem Cell Patent Ban, 334 SCIENCE
441, 441–42 (2011).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at part 1, art. 7.
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encourage and protect investments. Therefore, public policies about patent-
able subject matter, like other aspects of intellectual property, have been
shaped more by considerations of economic competitiveness than social
benefit.
A strict reading of the social utility rationale for intellectual property,
however, implies that the failure to facilitate scientific research and the de-
velopment of useful and affordable products undermines the legitimacy of
current norms and renders these arrangements subject to fundamental
changes that can assure greater benefits. Much of the debate on the patent-
ing of human genes, particularly in the secular community, has revolved
around utilitarian and consequentialist ethical issues as to whether the pat-
enting contributes to human welfare through encouraging scientific research
and investment, or impedes it. And these factors were raised by the plain-
tiffs in the legal case over Myriad Genetics’ patenting of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.50
Patents on human gene sequences have been controversial from their
inception. There has been persistent, if intermittently expressed, concern
regarding the inappropriateness of genetic patenting and its detrimental im-
pact on scientific advancement.51 One fundamental question that has been
raised is whether genetic patents issued are consistent with the criteria for
patenting.52 Initial opposition to human gene patenting within the scientific
community focused on the failure of the work on which the patent applica-
tions were based to provide knowledge of the function of the relevant gene
sequences. A second and persistent source of opposition has related to the
anticipated negative effects that patenting would have on research and ther-
apeutic applications of the knowledge generated by the HGP. The 1995
statement on the patenting of DNA sequences issues by the Human Genome
Organisation (HUGO), an international research consortium coordinating
and enhancing efforts in genome research, reflected those concerns and ex-
pressed HUGO’s dedication to the early release of genome information in
order to accelerate widespread investigation of the functional aspects of
genes.53
A 1993 opinion from the Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implica-
tions of Biotechnology to the European Commission put forward a similar
concern. Mindful of the economic value of biotechnology, the opinion
found no ethical rationale for opposing the patentability of inventions relat-
ing to living matter in principle. But the advisers expressed reservations
50. Complaint at 18–19, Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
51. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACAD. MED.,
1381, 1381 (2002).
52. See, for example, id. at 1381–82.
53. The Human Genome Organisation, HUGO Statement on Patenting of DNA Sequences,
(Jan. 1995) https://web.archive.org/web/19970412010739/http://hugo.gdb.org/patent.htm.
2013] RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 659
about the patentability of human genes and partial gene sequences on the
grounds that identifying genes or partial gene sequences without discover-
ing their function does not constitute an “inventive step” and therefore does
not meet the criteria for patenting.54 It also reiterated the need to protect
human dignity, although it was not specific about the best means to do so.55
Rather than being silenced, the level of indignation expressed by oppo-
nents of gene patenting in the scientific community has increased over time.
In part this reflects the fact that the process of isolating genes has become
more mechanized through the use of automatic sequencing machines, and it
is argued that this process requires no more than ordinary skills on the part
of the inventor.56 With this shift, scientists have been able to identify large
numbers of genes. In addition, it has meant that the patenting of genes has
begun to appear less as patenting end products and more like patenting sci-
entific information.57 The uneasiness regarding genetic patents is com-
pounded by the broad claims made in many of the patents that are granted.
Concerns expressed by individual scientists and scientific organiza-
tions also reflect their commitment to the norms of academic science pro-
moting open access and circulation of research findings about fundamental
discoveries. Until recently, academically based scientists did not seek pat-
ents on their discoveries and inventions, but instead sought recognition
through publication of their findings. A number of factors, particularly
changes in U.S. policy regarding the ownership of publicly funded research
and the increasing commercialization of science, have encouraged efforts to
secure a legal monopoly over discoveries deemed to have commercial po-
tential.58 Nevertheless, as a 2005 National Academies of Science report
comments, “Many research scientists who work in public institutions are
troubled by the concept of intellectual property protection for DNA-based
information, because it seems to be in conflict with scientific norms that
dictate that science will advance more rapidly if researchers enjoy free ac-
cess to knowledge.”59
In a much-cited 1998 article in Science, Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg warn that the proliferation of gene patents is creating so many
concurrent fragments of intellectual property rights by different owners that
54. Opinion of the Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology to the
European Commission, No. 3, 2.2.3 (Sept. 30, 1993).
55. Id.
56. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 1381.
57. Id. at 1383.
58. Matthew Herder, “Proliferating Patent Problems with Human Embryonic Stem Cell Re-
search?,” 3 J. BIOETHICAL INQ. 69, 71 (2006).
59. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC
AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
24 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006).
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it is likely to create serious problems for future product development.60 Hel-
ler and Eisenberg argue that the ownership of intellectual property rights is
becoming fragmented across institutions in the public and private sectors,
requiring researchers to spend a significant amount of time locating a multi-
tude of patent rights to pursue a project. This results in increased legal costs
and financial burdens as scientists bundle licenses together in order to con-
duct research or develop new products. Additionally, as they point out,
some researchers and developers, such as academics, may be ill equipped to
handle multiple transactions for acquiring rights to research tools and li-
censes. Faced with this situation, they anticipate that many researchers and
companies will choose to invest resources in less promising projects with
fewer licensing obstacles and lower initial start-up costs. Because patents
matter more to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, they also
foresee that corporations in this sector will be less willing to participate in
mechanisms like patent pools that can help overcome these problems. They
therefore conclude that, unless restrictive licensing practices are minimized,
the patent system is more likely to lead to fewer useful products for improv-
ing human health than to spur investment and product development.61
A 2005 survey to evaluate the effects of intellectual property rights on
genomic and proteomic research, undertaken for the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), found that “access to patents or information inputs into
biomedical research rarely imposes a significant burden for academic bi-
omedical researchers,” but concluded that this situation largely reflects the
failure of academic investigators to respect existing intellectual property re-
quirements.62 To put the matter another way, academic researchers, perhaps
assuming they were protected from liability for infringement by a broad
research exemption, tended to ignore and violate intellectual property re-
strictions. To date, with the exception of gene based diagnostic patents, es-
tablished companies have been reluctant to take action against most of these
academic infringements.63 The NAS report cautioned, however, that in the
absence of an established research exemption in this country,64 patent hold-
ers could become more active in asserting their intellectual property rights,
with more “demands for licensing fees, grant-back rights, and other terms
60. See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing that more intellec-
tual property rights in biotechnology may frustrate the development of useful inventions).
61. Id. at 701.
62. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 123.
63. Id. at 125.
64. The past claims of a research or experimental use exemption protecting scientists from
liability for patent infringement were essentially rendered defunct in Madey v. Duke University,
307 F.3d 1351, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In short, regardless of whether a particular institution
or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the
alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense.”).
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that are burdensome to research.”65 Moreover, researchers and institutions
that infringe on others’ intellectual property could later encounter difficul-
ties in commercializing their inventions. Finally, the NAS report anticipates
that as scientists increasingly use the high-throughput tools of genomics and
proteonomics to simultaneously study the properties of multiple genes or
proteins, the burden of securing the intellectual property rights covering
them could become “insupportable.”66 The NAS therefore called for steps
to be taken to anticipate and prevent the emergence of an increasingly prob-
lematic environment for research in genomics in the near future as more
patent applications are filed and more restrictions are placed on the availa-
bility of and access to information and resources.67
Concern has also been expressed elsewhere over restrictive licensing
of patented genes for clinical-testing services. A 2001 survey of 122 labora-
tory directors in the United States indicated that twenty-five percent had
stopped performing a clinical genetic test because of a patent or license.68
In addition, fifty-three percent reported deciding not to develop a new
clinical genetic test because of a patent or license.69 In 2010 the Department
of Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genet-
ics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) found that the prospect of patent pro-
tection of a genetic research discovery does not play a major role in
motivating scientists to conduct genetic research.70 Importantly, the
SACGHS also concluded that patents can harm genetic research by discour-
aging follow-on research.71 Additionally, SACGHS could not identify any
cases in which possession of exclusive rights was necessary for the devel-
opment of a particular genetic test.72 It therefore recommended the creation
of an exemption from patent infringement liability for anyone “making, us-
ing, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a test developed under the patent
for patient-care purposes,” as well as an exemption for those who “use pat-
ent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.”73 Myriad Genetics’ rigid
monopolization of diagnostic testing for susceptibility to breast cancer
linked to mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences that it has
patented—and the detrimental health impact of its doing so by restricting
65. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 3.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 133–49 (conclusions and recommendations).
68. Mildred K. Cho et al., Special Article, Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003).
69. Id.
70. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS
TO GENETIC TESTS 1, 1 (2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/
SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.
71. Id. at 2
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4, 97.
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testing—played a major role in the decision to pursue legal action against
Myriad.74
As we move into a genomic age, patents on human genes may interfere
with new developments, such as the ability to perform whole-genome se-
quencing. According to Christopher Mason, one of the authors of a study
that found companies hold patents on the entire genome, “[t]his means if
the Supreme Court upholds the current scope of the patents, no physician or
researcher can study the DNA of these genes from their patients, and no
diagnostic test or drug can be developed based on any of these genes with-
out infringing a patent.”75 He describes the situation as “‘patently ridicu-
lous’” and went on to say that “[f]ailure to resolve these ambiguities
perpetuates a direct threat to genomic liberty, or the right to one’s own
DNA.”76
III. OVERVIEW OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY’S INVOLVEMENT
The revolution in molecular biology and genetics in the second half of
the twentieth century presented the religious community with unique chal-
lenges and opportunities to define its social ethics and contribute to public
policy formation. In the process, a variety of faith bodies and moral theolo-
gians have framed positions on genetics and genetic patenting. Opposition
to the patenting of life forms has proceeded intermittently on a variety of
symbolic and substantive grounds. Beginning in 1980, when the General
Secretaries of the National Council of Churches, the Synagogue Council of
America, and the U.S. Catholic Conference wrote to President Carter
shortly after the Chakrabarty decision,77 groups and individuals within the
religious community expressed concerns about genetic patenting. Rather
than expressing an anti-technology position, this opposition often reflected
a religiously grounded conviction that biological patents constitute a threat
to the dignity and sanctity of life.78
The initiative that drew the most attention occurred in 1995 when lead-
ers of more than eighty religious denominations and faiths in the United
States—a broad array including Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish,
Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu—held a press conference to announce their
74. See generally E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the
Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39 (2010) (examining Myriad’s business decisions and the
context in which they were made).
75. James Foley, Entire Human Genome Is Patented by For-Profit Companies, NATURE
WORLD NEWS, http://www.natureworldnews.com/home/news/services/print.php?article_id=1059
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
76. Ruth Saunders, Companies Hold Patents on Entire Human Genome, BIONEWS, http://
www.bionews.org.uk/page_279342.asp (Last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
77. Claire Randall, Bernard Mandelbaum & Thomas Kelly, A Letter to the President of the
United States, in GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at app. 47–49.
78. For an analysis of the history and grounding of the religious opposition, see generally
UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES, supra note 1, at 125–65.
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opposition to the patenting of genetically engineered animals and human
genes, cells, and organs.79 They launched the Joint Appeal Against Human
and Animal Patenting (Joint Appeal), a coalition organized by the General
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church and Jeremy
Rifkin, an anti-biotechnology activist who was the head of the Foundation
on Economic Trends. Each of the signatories subscribed to the text of a
brief statement:
We, the undersigned religious leaders, oppose the patenting of
human and animal life forms. We are disturbed by the U.S. Pat-
ent’s Office’s recent decision to patent human body parts and sev-
eral genetically engineered animals. We believe that humans and
animals are creations of God, not humans, and as such should not
be patented as human inventions.80
An accompanying press release indicated that the signatories planned a
nationwide educational campaign in the nation’s churches, synagogues,
newspapers, and temples to raise critical theological concerns about the pat-
enting of life,81 but such a campaign never developed.
Although nearly two hundred religious leaders signed the Joint Ap-
peal, the position taken in that statement does not reflect a consensus within
the religious community, not even within the majority of the faith commu-
nions represented. With the exception of the Methodist bishops, the signato-
ries were not representing the official positions or policies of their
respective communions. One indication of the complexity of the situation is
that although the U.S. Catholic Conference declined to support the state-
ment, ninety-one Roman Catholic bishops became signatories. At the time
of the Joint Appeal few of the participating communions had an explicit
policy on the appropriateness of patenting human genes or life forms. Of
those that did, the General Conference of the United Methodist Church
adopted a position in 1992 that affirmed the understanding of the sanctity of
God’s creation and God’s ownership of life, and identified that claims of
exclusive ownership rights to genes as a means of making genetic technolo-
gies accessible raised serious theological concerns.82 It went on, “[w]e urge
that genes and genetically modified organisms (human, plant, animal) be
held as common resources and not be exclusively controlled, or patented.”
A month after the Joint Appeal, in June 1995, the Southern Baptist
Convention adopted a resolution that requested “an immediate moratorium
on the patenting of animal and human tissues and genetic sequences until a
79. See UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES, supra note, 1 at 125 (citing “Joint Appeal Against Human
and Animal Patenting,” text of the press conference announcement made available by the General
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., May 17, 1995).
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, New Developments in Genetic Science, in THE BOOK OF
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 325, 332–33 (1992).
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full and complete discussion has occurred.”83 The Southern Baptist Con-
vention has remained more actively involved in the patenting issue than
other Joint Appeal signatories. It was the only denomination to submit an
amicus brief to the Supreme Court to present its view in the Myriad case.84
A variety of denominations have developed educational resources on
genetics for their own members, a few of which include a discussion of
patenting issues. One of the most recent of these, Genetics! Where Do We
Stand as Christians, prepared in 2001 by the Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America, has a chapter on gene patenting.85 This resource is unusual in
that it includes a brief primer on the legal background and presents compet-
ing perspectives on patenting. It is also gently critical of the Joint Appeal
and positions taken by others in the religious community on the issue.
It would be erroneous to portray the religious community or specific
communions as having a consistent witness or involvement in the discus-
sions related to the patenting of life forms. As with many other scientifi-
cally based issues, only a small number of persons within church agencies
and theological institutions have paid attention to developments or followed
debates among secular experts. Religious statements on patenting have
tended to be followed by long periods of silence, often for many years at a
time. This is a pattern characteristic of the way many communions have
dealt with other issues as well.86 Since much of the writing on patenting by
moral theologians and ethicists has been reactive to other initiatives in the
religious community, there has been little sustained work on the topic by
them either.
There has been little apparent interest or involvement related to patent-
ing in recent years. In 2003 a National Council of Churches Exploratory
Committee on Human Genetic Technologies report, which was written in
response to the mandate to identify the challenges posed by human applica-
tions of genetic technologies and to evaluate the merits of long-term efforts
in this area, including engagement with the biotechnology industry,87 did
83. SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, On the Patenting of Animal and Human Genes, in
ANNUAL OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 91, 92 (1995).
84. Brief of the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention
& Prof. D. Brian Scarnecchia as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Association for Molecu-
lar Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398, 2012).
85. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, GENETICS! WHERE DO WE STAND AS
CHRISTIANS? 40–45 Chicago: Augsburg Fortress Publishers on behalf of the Division for Church
in Society of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, (2001), ch. 5.
86. This author was the World Issues Secretary of the United Church Board for World Minis-
tries of the United Church of Christ for nearly ten years, where she directed peace, justice, and
human rights ministries for the agency, and observed this trend. Her reflections about the public
policy ministries of mainline churches are presented in AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, FAITH, POWER, AND
POLITICS: POLITICAL MINISTRY IN MAINLINE CHURCHES (1991).
87. EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES OF CHRIST, REPORT OF THE NCC EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN GENETIC
TECHNOLOGIES TO THE NCC GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2003).
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not propose gene patenting as one potential focus of future initiatives. The
report failed to mention gene patenting even though the Chairperson of the
Committee, Jaydee Hanson, had played a central role in the Joint Appeal.
Religious voices were also not represented in the discussions as to whether
human embryonic stem cells should be patentable subject matter. Because
human embryonic stem cells are derived from three- to five-day-old em-
bryos (technically blastocysts), allowing patents on human embryonic stem
cells has potential implications for human dignity, certainly more so than
human genes and gene fragments. The lack of involvement in stem cell
patenting might have reflected greater concerns among some of the relig-
ious communities with the more fundamental questions about whether it is
ethically appropriate to derive human embryonic stem cell lines and engage
in embryonic stem cell research.88
Another indication of the decline of interest is that of the sixty amicus
briefs filed in the legal suit, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, when it was to be heard by the Supreme Court, only one repre-
sented a religious denomination or actor—the amici curiae of the Ethics &
Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention.89 It is
only possible to speculate on why this agency continued its advocacy when
other denominations did not. The strength of its convictions may have
played a role. Continuity in religious leadership may have been another
factor. Another possibility is that someone offered to author the brief on
behalf of the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission so the agency did not
have to invest much time or resources in the initiative.
IV. ISSUES RAISED BY RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS ON HUMAN
GENETIC PATENTING
A. Should There Be Patents on Life Forms and Human Genes?
One of the fundamental issues underlying the debate is whether there
should be patents on life forms and specifically on human genes. Many in
the religious community, even those who may not oppose patenting per se,
have been uncomfortable with treating DNA as just another commodity that
can be owned and controlled by individuals or corporations. Sometimes this
discomfort has reflected an assumption or intuition that there are categories
of things which by their very nature should not be treated as commodities.
A line of philosophical thinking stresses the moral need to protect cer-
tain items from being treated as economic commodities. Michael Walzer’s
concept of “blocked exchanges” is useful here. He notes that there are cate-
gories of items about which society has determined distribution should be
88. See generally Audrey R. Chapman, The Ethics of Patenting Human Embryonic Stem
Cells, supra note 1, at 261 (exploring the ethical issues raised by human embryonic stem cell
patenting).
89. Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 84.
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on a noneconomic basis.90 His list of fourteen such “blocked exchanges” or
things which cannot be bought and sold includes human beings; political
power and influence; criminal justice; freedom of speech, press, religion,
assembly; exemptions from military service, jury duty, or other com-
munally imposed work; political offices; and love and friendship.91 More
recently, Michael Sandel makes a similar argument in his book What
Money Can’t Buy.92
The assumption or intuition that there are categories of things that by
their very nature should not be treated as commodities has important impli-
cations for understanding the nature of property. As Paul Thompson points
out, property and ownership are moral precepts encompassing philosophical
beliefs as well as legal, economic, and cultural practices. He distinguishes
between two basic approaches to property—an instrumental and an onto-
logical frame of reference.93 As instrumental or utilitarian conception
presumes that property itself is a legal fiction, an artifact of a legal code,
which is validated to the extent that it is useful in promoting some more
fundamental social, political, or economic end.94 Most advocates of life pat-
enting have an instrumental or utilitarian conception of property. They jus-
tify granting patents on biological organisms on the grounds that
intellectual property rights will bring individual or social benefits through
promoting research and development of useful medical applications.
In contrast, many of the opponents of patenting biological organisms
hold, at least implicitly, what Thompson defines as an ontological concep-
tion of property.95 An ontological approach bases property status on traits
or characteristics alleged to inhere in specific objects and thereby excludes
broad categories of objects from private ownership. Each of the three major
forms of ontological reasoning Thompson identifies limits property claims
in some way. Natural law philosophy stipulates that property must be based
on traditional practices deemed justified by their obviousness and noncon-
troversial nature. Labor theory confines property claims to objects that are
the product of human work. There is also broad consensus that ownership
of human beings should be prohibited. In addition to excludability, onto-
logical approaches offer two other criteria to consider whether property
claims are appropriate. These are the concepts of rivalry (whether the use or
consumption of the goods by one person diminishes the availability for
others) and alienability (whether a good can be dissociated from one owner
90. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 100–03 (1983).
91. Id.
92. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS
(2012).
93. Paul B. Thompson, Conceptions of Property and the Biotechnology Debate, 45 BIOS-
CIENCE 275, 275–78 (1995).
94. Id. at 275–77.
95. Id. at 277–78.
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and transferred to another).96 Thompson argues that an ontological ap-
proach provides strong grounds for rejecting most forms of intellectual
property claims. In particular, he concludes that recombinant DNA tech-
niques challenge the natural law bias against alienating goods from previ-
ous patterns of ownership and exchange.97
Thompson’s distinction between instrumental and ontological ap-
proaches to property helps illuminate why groups holding different views
on the appropriateness of genetic patents frequently talk past one another.
Advocates of life patenting sometimes assume that critics do not understand
the limited nature of the property rights patenting entails. To correct an
assumed misconception about the nature of property, property is character-
ized not as ownership of a tangible object, but rather as a bundle of rights in
an object. In this line of reasoning, patents are conceptualized as very lim-
ited forms of property rights. Concurrently, advocates of life patenting un-
derscore that patents do not confer positive right to possess, make, use, or
sell anything. Instead, they emphasize patents convey only the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, selling, or importing the patented item or
from carrying out a patented process.98
But the issue is both different from and more fundamental than a mis-
understanding of the nature of intellectual property. Defenders of patents
typically have an instrumental approach, offering a consequentialist-incen-
tive rationale. Industry has long held that intellectual property rights are
necessary incentives for major investments in research and development
needed to commercialize new products that are of benefit to the public. In
contrast, religious opponents of patenting usually base their criticisms on
ontological principles. Still others try to have it both ways—they attempt to
mix an ontological and an instrumental approach to property. On the one
hand, they have a moral intuition that it is inappropriate to patent life forms,
particularly human tissue and DNA. Nevertheless, they affirm the utilitarian
goal of facilitating research and product development and sometimes even
the premise that industry is entitled to financial incentives and rewards.
Moreover, they are unwilling or unable to critique the claims that patents
benefit the public by stimulating investment in research, development, and
commercialization of new products.
96. Id. at 277–81.
97. Id. at 278.
98. Pilar N. Ossorio, Property Rights and Human Bodies, in WHO OWNS LIFE?, supra note
35, at 223, 224–26.
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B. God’s Ownership of Life – What is Being Patented
Some groups in the religious community have put forth the view, per-
haps at least in part on symbolic grounds,99 that the patenting of life forms
implies that human beings rather than God are the inventors of these forms
of life. For example, C. Ben Mitchell, then a member of the Southern Bap-
tist Convention’s Christian Life Commission, argued in a paper prepared
for the AAAS dialogue group that composition of matter patents on living
organisms is problematic because these patents impinge on the sanctity of
God’s creation and God’s status as the Creator and therefore the ultimate
“owner” of life.100 By claiming exclusionary property rights in a genetically
altered composition of matter, “the human manipulator is assuming a place
which belongs alone to God, the divine Artificer.”101 Patenting of human
body parts is doubly problematic for Mitchell because he believes it also
violates human dignity.102 In an article co-authored by Mitchell and Rich-
ard Land, they contend that human genes are sacred and warrant a different
status and treatment than non-human genes and cell lines.103 They ground
this claim on their belief that human beings alone bear the image of God
and the imago Dei pervades human life in all its parts.104 The amici curiae
brief of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Bap-
tist Convention to the Supreme Court in the Myriad Genetics case reiterates
this theme. It argues that allowing anyone to claim ownership over the ma-
terial that constitutes the human body “reverses the roles of the Creator and
the created” and constitutes a “daring infringement of the law of nature.”105
Without evaluating the specifics of this line of argument, it is relevant
to note that other thinkers in the religious community take issue with this
perspective. Theologian Ronald Cole-Turner, for example, proposes we un-
derstand God’s ownership as quite different from human ownership.106 Ac-
cording to Cole-Turner, God owns all things, not in an exclusive sense, but
to give the goodness of creation as gifts to be shared by all creatures. He
suggests we conceptualize God’s ownership as God reserving the right to
99. The interpretation that these concerns are more symbolic than substantive is put forward
in Mark J. Hanson, Patenting Genes and Life: Improper Commodification?, in WHO OWNS LIFE?,
supra note 35, at 161.
100. C. Ben Mitchell, A Southern Baptist Looks at Patenting Life, in PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1, at 167, 174–76.
101. Id. at 176.
102. Id. at 177.
103. Richard D. Land & C. Ben Mitchell, Patenting Life: No, 63 FIRST THINGS 20, 21 (1996).
104. Id. at 20–21.
105. Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 84, at 6 (quoting William
Lloyd Garrison, Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Convention, SELECTIONS
FROM THE WRITINGS OF W. L. GARRISON, http://utc.iath.virginia.edu/abolitn/abeswlgct.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2013)).
106. Ronald Cole-Turner, Theological Perspectives on the Status of DNA; A Contribution to
the Debate over Genetic Patenting, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 150, 152.
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define their purpose, value, and relationship to other creatures.107 When it
comes to the nonhuman creation, human ownership may therefore proceed
as long as it is consistent with God’s definition of their purposes. Or to put
the matter another way, God’s ownership does not exclude but qualifies
human ownership.108 Ownership of a person, however, always violates
God’s prior claims “because human persons are declared to be in the image
of God, which means that God has defined the purpose of every human life
to be a free and responsible person able to offer one’s life to God in worship
and service.”109 Cole-Turner also takes issue with the view of DNA as sa-
cred and equates it with a form of vitalism that equates the sacred with all
of life or a life principle.110 In Cole-Turner’s view therefore there should be
no intrinsic theological objection to biological patents. He concludes that
individuals and corporations may claim intellectual property rights in bio-
logical components as long as they are exercised in a manner consistent
with religious, legal, and business norms.111
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) criticizes the
position that patenting demeans God’s role as the Creator on other grounds:
that it incorrectly sharply divides creation into the natural and artificial and
assigns God’s creative activity to one, but not the other.112According to the
ELCA, human ingenuity is a natural gift of God and therefore divine crea-
tivity works through human creativity. Every living being, whether geneti-
cally altered, both the natural and the artificial, have God-given dignity and
both are equally gifts of God’s creative activity.113
C. Implications for Human Dignity
In making the claim that patenting human DNA and tissue demeans
human life and dignity, the religious community echoes concerns raised by
some ethicists in the secular community. Moreover, given the commitment
to the value of the human person in Western religious tradition, a concern
with the implications of patents on human dignity is understandable. Both
Christianity and Judaism conceptualize the human person as the imago Dei,
a representation of the divine creator.114 The affirmation of humanity as the
image of God plays an important role in the thinking of at least some of the
religious opponents of patenting.115 Some religious opponents of patenting
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 155–63.
111. Id. at 163.
112. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, GENETICS! WHERE DO WE STAND AS
CHRISTIANS? 43 (2001).
113. Id. at 43.
114. See, for example, the conceptualization of humankind in Genesis 1:26–27.
115. See Ted Peters, Should We Patent God’s Creation? 35 DIALOG 117, 122 (1996).
670 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:3
also assume that the protections accorded to persons should extend to
human tissue and body parts as well.116
Nevertheless, the affirmation of humanity as the image of God does
not in and of itself provide a clear grounding for opposing patenting of
altered human tissue or DNA. One of the complexities of this issue is that
conceptions and interpretations of the phrase “image of God” have differed
dramatically. Theologian Douglas John Hall has shown that, through the
centuries, commentators have had a conspicuous tendency to identify those
traits or gifts that are valued by their particular culture as the central mean-
ing of the phrase.117 Moreover, the acknowledgement of human dignity and
even the sacredness of persons have not precluded religious acceptance of
slavery, war, the death penalty, or unspeakable forms of abuse and torture.
The concept of the inherent dignity of the human person is well estab-
lished in both U.S. and international law and provides the foundation for all
current international human rights instruments. The Thirteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution also prohibits owning and selling human beings.118
It is relevant here to note that the European Patent Office restricts the sub-
ject matter eligible for intellectual property protection so as to eliminate
inventions that are inconsistent with protecting human dignity. Provisions
of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions exclude inventions from patenta-
bility that offend human dignity and ethical and moral principles recognized
in member states.119 The Directive, for example, instructs member states
that “Patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles
safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person.”120
Proponents of patenting, on the other hand, often distinguish between
the status of human material in the body and outside of it. Even if they
recognize a moral basis for excluding patenting of human material, they
claim that it does not extend to patenting ex vivo DNA sequences.121 Euro-
pean patent law, for example, makes this distinction. Although it excludes
the human body at any stage of formation or development—including germ
cells and the sequence or partial sequence of a human gene from patent-
116. For example, the Joint Appeal statement objected to the PTO’s decision to patent body
parts. “Religious Leaders Prepare to Fight Patents on Genes,” N. Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/05/13/us/company-news-religious-leaders-prepare-to-fight-patents-on-
genes.html.
117. DOUGLASS JOHN HALL, IMAGING GOD: DOMINION AS STEWARDSHIP, 88–112 (1986).
118. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII.
119. Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 37, at 37–40.
120. Id. at 16.
121. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND PATENT-
ING DNA SEQUENCES, 4–8 (1994) (discussing “whether, from a moral perspective, human DNA
sequences and other things that occur in nature–and hence in that sense part of society’s common
trust–should be patentable when isolated and purified ex vivo?”).
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ing—it adds the caveat that any such element isolated from the human body
or otherwise produced by a technical process is patentable.122
Does protecting human dignity require treating human biological
materials as blocked exchanges, that is, something that cannot be commodi-
fied and thereby be owned and sold? It is relevant to note that there is a
tradition, supported by philosophical and ethical thinking, of moral opposi-
tion to the ownership and sale of human parts. Beginning with the collec-
tion of blood for transfusions, measures have been taken to protect against
the development of a market in human body parts and organs. The position
that human organs required for transplants should be obtained through do-
nation as a gift is based on the argument that allowing an organ market to
develop would place pressure on poor people to sell organs, enabling the
affluent to exploit poor and vulnerable individuals, as indeed has occurred
in some countries. Claims are also made that allowing a market to develop
in human biological material might affect social bonds and diminish human
dignity.123 While individuals are sometimes paid for the collection of blood
or semen, such payment, from a legal perspective, is considered to be for
services rendered and not remuneration for the commodity itself.124
The question of whether patenting human genes is wrong because it
diminishes human dignity was the subject of an article written by philoso-
pher Baruch Brody for the AAAS dialogue group.125 Brody acknowledges
that it is perfectly appropriate to limit intellectual property rights in human
genes when necessary to preserve human dignity, but he does not believe
that most objections to human gene patenting warrant doing so.126 He ex-
amines and evaluates four sets of claims that patents on human genes in-
fringe on human dignity: (1) ownership of human genes is equivalent to
ownership of human beings; (2) patents commodify and commercialize; (3)
patents cheapen what defines human identity; and (4) patents will lead to
eugenic applications that undermine human integrity. Of the various con-
cerns that have been put forward, he identifies only two that he considers to
have potential implications for human dignity. Brody recommends first that
applications to patent an entire set of genes should be rejected, if ever pro-
posed, because such patents would entail commodification of that which
defines our identity.127 His second proposed restriction, related to protect-
ing against eugenics, would disallow the patenting of genetic modifications
122. Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 37, at art. 5.
123. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ETHICAL
DILEMMAS AND POLICY CHOICES 4–5 (2003) (discussing the policy implications of organ
markets).
124. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWN-
ERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 11–13, 115–25 (1987).
125. Baruch Brody, Protecting Human Dignity and the Patenting of Human Genes, in PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 111–26.
126. Id. at 123–24.
127. Id. at 114–23.
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that are incompatible with human dignity.128 Otherwise, he finds no sound
reasons to reject the patenting of a specific human gene on the grounds that
it is incompatible with protecting human dignity.129
Theologian Ted Peters concurs with much of Brody’s analysis.130 His
view is that an individual person’s dignity is not threatened by patenting
knowledge of a portion of DNA that may reside in his or her cells.131 Ac-
cording to Peters, the concept of intrinsic worth applies to the person as a
whole, as an individual, not to any parts or knowledge or parts. Peters also
argues that knowledge of a DNA sequence is general knowledge of the
physiological make up of humans in general, and not of a particular
body.132 Considering whether knowledge of the entire genome of a particu-
lar person would constitute a violation of human dignity, Peters underscores
that one’s personal identity is not determined by the genome alone: “Each
of us is more than our genome, and dignity applies to who we are as a
whole human being. Whether it is ethical or unethical to patent knowledge
of an individual’s genome, the dignity of that person as a person is not at
risk.”133
D. Commodification and Commercialization
Relatedly, others argue that patenting human genes will demean life by
turning it into a commodity with a commercially determined value. This
concern is widely shared in the religious community. A statement by Meth-
odist Bishop Kenneth Carder warned that the patenting of genes would rele-
gate the building blocks of life to their economic worth.134 He further
reflected that the fundamental conflict with which we are confronted is be-
tween reverence for life valued as a gift and exploitation of life for its mar-
ketability.135 Using more colorful language, Richard Land, President of the
Southern Baptist Convention’s Christian Life Commission, was quoted in
newspapers as saying, “Marketing human life is a form of genetic slavery.
Instead of whole persons being marched in shackles to the market block,
human cell lines and gene sequences are labeled, patented and sold to the
highest bidders.”136 Even Ted Peters, generally an agnostic on the ethical
128. Id. at 122–24.
129. Id. at 111–26.
130. Ted Peters, DNA and Human Dignity: A Response to Baruch Brody, in PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 1, at 127–36.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 133–35.
133. Id. at 134.
134. Mark J. Hanson, Religious Voices in Biotechnology: The Case of Gene Patenting, 27 THE
HASTINGS CTR. REP., 9 (1997) (quoting Kenneth J. Carder).
135. Id. at 10 (quoting Kenneth J. Carder).
136. Peters, supra note 115, at 117.
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implications of gene patenting, has written about the danger of commercial-
izing life.137
How valid is this criticism? Margaret Jane Radin, a legal theorist, has
examined the social process by which something comes to be understood as
an appropriate subject of free market transactions from previously being
valued in a noneconomic manner.138 She distinguishes between literal or
narrow and broad or metaphorical senses of commodification. Commodifi-
cation in the narrow sense describes events in which material goods and
economic services are literally bought and sold. According to Radin, com-
modification also encompasses a worldview that conceives of human attrib-
utes as fungible owned objects even where no money literally changes
hands.139 Much like the religious critics of patenting, Radin believes that
the way we conceive of things matters to who we are. She concurs that a
commodified view of personhood undermines a Kantian conception of the
person as an end-in-itself.140 Nevertheless, Radin recognizes that com-
modification is not an all-or-nothing process. She introduces the useful con-
cept of incomplete commodification, which refers to a situation in which
only one segment of society accepts a commodified understanding.141 Simi-
larly, she points out the possibilities for the coexistence of commodified
and noncommodified understandings in a society.142
Mark Hanson uses Radin’s categories to show how the genetic patent-
ing debate relates both to Radin’s narrow and broad conceptions of com-
modification.143 On one level, patents may be seen as related to the narrow
sense of commodification, the actual buying and selling of material goods
and economic services, because they literally enable the commercialization
of and possible monetary transactions involving genes and other biological
material.144 Religious concerns about a kind of “slippery slope” apparently
anticipated that market rhetoric once applied to genes and tissue may be
contagious and lead to further literal commodification of human beings.
Nevertheless, he quite rightly suspects that what is really at stake in the
religious objections to patenting, independent of any claims about God’s
ownership, is Radin’s broader conception of commodification.145 Here he
137. See TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENETIC DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM 124–25,
140 (2d ed. 1997) (describing an overlap between divine creativity and human creativity, arguing
that ownership of the body cannot rightly belong to humans for reasons such as human dignity,
and suggesting that the focus of regulation might better be directed from patent laws to oversight
of laboratory research).
138. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS 1–15 (1996).
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id. at 102.
141. Id. at 102–03.
142. Id.
143. Hanson, supra note 134, at 15–18.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 21.
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notes the criticism of Rabbi David Saperstein, speaking broadly on behalf
of religious critics, “that patenting would lead to the most fundamental deg-
radation of all—the turning of all nature, perhaps even humanity itself, into
an ownable market commodity.”146
There is disagreement on whether human gene patenting will promote
commodification. Radin acknowledges in her book the potential corrupting
influence of market rhetoric.147 Richard Gold goes further in his book Body
Parts, arguing that making any commodity, including human biological ma-
terial, subject to property claims will translate its valuation into a market
price.148 Moreover, he claims that market modes of valuation preempt
other, more authentic and meaningful forms of valuation, such as valuing
human DNA, blood, or tissue as inherently valuable in themselves and as
being instrumentally valuable in aiding human health. According to Gold,
property discourse—that is, the sum of the assumptions, conceptions, and
language used by judges, lawyers, and legislators in allocating rights of
control over goods—promotes economic modes of valuation because it as-
sumes that proprietary goods are best allocated through the market.149 He
therefore concludes that safeguarding noneconomic values related to the
human body requires that human biological materials be treated as nonpro-
prietary goods.150 To this end, he recommends constructing a method of
allocating rights of control over these materials that takes both economic
and noneconomic modes of valuation into account, but does not offer the
specifics of such a scheme.
E. The Ontological and Metaphysical Status of DNA
Is DNA sacred? While labeling something as sacred carries import to
people of faith, the concept of the sacred is rarely conceptualized clearly.
Life, particularly human life, is widely regarded in Western culture as hav-
ing intrinsic worth. Virtually all adherents of the dominant Western relig-
ious traditions would most likely affirm Bishop Carder’s statement, some
perhaps only in reference to human persons, that “life is a sacred gift from
God the Creator. As a gift from God, life has intrinsic value.”151 The funda-
mental principle of the dignity and intrinsic worth of each individual under-
girds international human rights norms and the U.S. constitutional and legal
systems.
146. Id. at 17 (quoting David Saperstein).
147. See Radin, supra note 138.
148. See generally E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP
OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996) (discussing the ethical dangers of applying an eco-
nomic analysis of ownership to human biological materials).
149. Id. at 5–12.
150. Id. at 171–77.
151. UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES, supra note 1, at 154 (quoting Bishop Carder).
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If human life is sacred, is it appropriate to confer sacred status to
DNA? Some religious critics of patenting imply that DNA is also sacred.
The Southern Baptist Convention’s amicus brief states that DNA is not sim-
ply a chemical sequence that can be manipulated and owned by scientists: it
is a divine gift central to human existence.152 Langdon Gilkey has similarly
argued concerning genes that “here, if anywhere, is the locus, principle, or
vehicle of the sacred in nature, the principle of vitality for life, what a ge-
neticist friend of mine calls the icon of the sacred.”153 Gilkey also states
that genes are in the image of God, implying their worth lies in their rela-
tion to God.154
Or, is DNA merely a complex molecule deserving of no more or less
respect than other organic chemicals? Representatives of the biotechnology
industry generally describe genes and DNA as mere chemical compounds.
Several theologians critical of the Joint Appeal initiative have argued
against vesting DNA, even human DNA, with a sacred status. Writing in
Science magazine, Ronald Cole-Turner asserted “there is no metaphysical
difference between DNA and other complex chemicals. Therefore, there is
no distinctly religious ground for objecting to patenting of DNA.”155
Here it is relevant to note that the book The DNA Mystique documents
the ways that the gene has become “a cultural icon, a symbol, almost a
magical force.”156 The authors, Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee, conclude
that DNA images and narratives of DNA in popular culture convey a mes-
sage that they term genetic essentialism. Genetic essentialism reduces the
self to a molecular entity and equates human beings with their genes. Ac-
cording to Nelkin and Lindee, DNA currently functions in many respects as
a secular equivalent of the medieval Christian conception of the soul in that
it is considered to contain the essential human self, to be the source of
individual difference, and to promise a form of eternal life, either through
progeny or through the body reconstituted by scientific manipulation.157
The paucity of serious theological analysis on the nature of DNA from
opponents of genetic patenting makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not
their critique reflects an underlying genetic essentialism. Religious critics of
genetic patenting appear to vest genes with a special kind of intrinsic value,
possibly even a sacred status, which makes patenting inappropriate. But
their grounds for doing so are not clear. As Mark Hanson has commented,
152. Brief for Amici Curiae of the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern
Baptist Convention and Prof. D. Brian Scarnecchia in Support of Petitioners, supra note 84, at 2,
4.
153. LANGDON GILKEY, NATURE, REALITY, AND THE SACRED: THE NEXUS OF SCIENCE AND
RELIGION, 96–97 (1993).
154. Id. at 143–57.
155. Ronald Cole-Turner, Religion and Gene Patenting, 270 SCIENCE 52, 52 (1995).
156. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CUL-
TURAL ICON (W.H. Freeman ed., 1995).
157. Id. at 39.
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“the conceptions of DNA that underlie the religious critics’ objections
based on ownership—especially the claims that genes are sacred and that
even human DNA fragments bear the image of God—are theologically un-
derdeveloped and ultimately problematic.”158
Of course, one does not have to invest human genes with sacred status
to argue that they are fundamentally unique and deserve special treatment
on that basis. An amicus brief filed by James Watson, co-discoverer of
DNA’s double helix, argued that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, in deciding Myriad Genetics, should recognize the “funda-
mentally unique nature of the human gene. . . It is a chemical entity, but
DNA’s importance flows from its ability to encode and transmit the instruc-
tions for creating humans. Life’s instructions ought not be controlled by
legal monopolies created at the whim of Congress or the courts.”159
F. Myriad Genetics Case
In 2009 the issue of the patentability of human genes finally was
brought before the courts. Until this case, no court had addressed whether
an isolated human gene is patentable subject matter. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) joined with the Public Patent Foundation at the
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law in New York, a series of medical organi-
zations including the American Medical Association and the American So-
ciety of Human Genetics, and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, medical geneticists, advocates for women’s health, and sev-
eral individual patients to challenge the patents that Myriad Genetics and
the University of Utah Research Foundation received for the genes referred
to as BRCA1 and BRCA2.160 By extension, their case attempts to invalidate
all isolated but unaltered human gene patents.161 Mutations in the BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes significantly increase the risk of breast and ovarian can-
cer.162 Myriad’s patents have enabled this small biotechnology company to
exercise monopoly control over diagnostic testing for all mutations in these
genes, even new diagnostic tests that the company does not offer.163
The suit, filed in May 2009 in Federal District Court in New York,164
argued that the patents Myriad holds should never have been granted on
either the genes or the tests because under U.S. patent law products of na-
ture are not patent-eligible.165 The plaintiffs also contended that Myriad’s
158. Hanson, supra note 134, at 20.
159. Brief for Amicus Curiae James D. Watson in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for Molec-
ular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-CV-4515).
160. Complaint, supra note 50, at 3.
161. Id. at 21–22, 30.
162. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risks and Genetic Testing Fact Sheet, NAT’L CANCER
INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
163. E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, supra note 74, at S42.
164. Complaint, supra note 50, at 1.
165. Id. at 3.
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patents restrict research and scientific progress.166 The several individual
patients involved in the suit stated they suffered harm because Myriad’s
exercise of its patent rights restricted their ability to receive supplementary
testing for cancer-predisposing genomic deletions or duplications or addi-
tional confirmatory testing.167 The plaintiffs had the support, expressed in
friend-of-the court briefs, of many parties representing the medical profes-
sion, biomedical researchers, and other opponents of monopoly rights on
human DNA, but significantly, no organizations or individual representing
the religious community submitted an amicus brief.168
Taking a position typical of industry, the defendants asked the court to
dismiss the case on the grounds that the work of isolating DNA from the
body transforms it and makes it patentable.169 They cited the position of the
USPTO that human ingenuity is required to create isolated DNA molecules
and its 2001 guidelines formally establishing that molecules derived from
genetic material can be the basis for a patent.170 Furthermore, they pointed
out that in the thirty years that gene patents have been granted, this was the
first case challenging their patent eligibility.171
Although many in the patent field predicted the suit would be thrown
out,172 it was not. In March 2010, much to the surprise of many patent
experts, a federal judge invalidated seven patents held jointly by Myriad
Genetics and the University of Utah.173 Most significantly, United States
District Court Judge Robert W. Sweet ruled that Myriad’s patents were
“improperly granted” because they involved a “law of nature.”174 Specifi-
cally, “[b]ecause the claimed isolated DNA is not markedly different from
native DNA as it exists in nature, it constitutes unpatentable subject mat-
ter.”175 He also ruled that Myriad’s method patents, under which it exer-
cised a monopoly to market a diagnostic test costing more than $3,000 to
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 10–13.
168. For this author’s review of the amicus briefs filed in this case, see generally, BRCA
Resources, CENTER FOR PUBLIC GENOMICS, http://www.genome.duke.edu/centers/cpg/BRCA-re-
sources/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
169. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (1) in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20–26, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515) (making legal argument for patentability of isolated natural products);
Answer by Respondent U.S. Patent & Trademark Office at 12, Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp.
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515) (requesting dismissal); Answer by Respondent Myr-
iad Genetics at 14, Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515)
(requesting dismissal).
170. Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 169, at 26–28.
171. See id. at 1.
172. John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent, N. Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/30gene.html.
173. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp. 2d 181,
232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
174. Id. at 237.
175. Id. at 232.
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assess mutations in the BRCA1 and 2 genes, were also invalid because they
were based on analyzing and comparing DNA sequences and thus did not
constitute a transformative act.176
Myriad Genetics appealed the ruling. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit—a court traditionally sympathetic to patent
claims177—came to a different conclusion. It overturned the key ruling on
the patentability of genes of the Federal District Court.178 Instead the court
held that isolated and modified DNA molecules can be patented and, on the
basis of this reasoning, it upheld Myriad’s patent on the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.179 However, the panel upheld Judge Sweet’s district court
ruling that Myriad’s five broadest patents on methods of isolating and mod-
ifying DNA were invalid.180 Like the District Court,181 the Federal Circuit
found that genetic diagnostic methods that rely on “comparing” or “analyz-
ing” DNA sequences with corresponding patient DNA samples to identify
the presence of mutations are not transformative and hence are not
patentable.182
In December 2011, the case was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. The Court chose not to issue an opinion at that time. Instead it
set aside the Federal Circuit’s decision favoring Myriad and directed the
Federal Circuit to review the case in light of a recently issued Supreme
Court ruling in a case involving a blood test developed by Prometheus Lab-
oratories.183 In that case, Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court unanimously re-
versed a Federal Circuit ruling on the grounds that companies are not
permitted to patent observations about natural phenomena.184
In August 2012, a Federal Circuit panel reaffirmed the Supreme
Court’s holding that the process of isolating genes requires human interven-
tion and therefore can be patented.185 Judge Alan Lourie, writing for the
majority, stated “Everything and everyone comes from nature, following its
laws. But the compositions here are not natural products. They are the prod-
ucts of man, albeit following, as all materials do, laws of nature.”186 The
176. Id. at 238.
177. Federal Circuit Dubbed a “Rogue Appeals Court” Seen as Biased in Favor of Patent
Holders, LIFE SCI. & TECH. LEGAL BULL. (Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, Mo.) Oct. 3,
2012, at 1–2.
178. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
179. Id. at 1350–54.
180. Id. at 1358.
181. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp. 2d 181,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
182. Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357.
183. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
184. Id. at 1305.
185. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. 2012) and aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
186. Id. at 1331.
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Circuit also affirmed its decision that the Myriad method patents did not
meet the threshold for patentability.187
After the second decision was issued, the ACLU again asked the Su-
preme Court to hear the case. In November 2012, the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari. Of note, the Court limited the appeal to a single
issue, the most contentious one raised in the case: whether human genes are
patentable.188 Other issues decided by the Federal Circuit will therefore
stand.
One of several surprises in the case was the decision of the Solicitor
General to enter the case when it was appealed to the Federal Circuit by
filing an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. government.189 The Solicitor
General submitted a similar brief to the Supreme Court.190 Both briefs took
a position contrary to the longstanding policy and practice of the USPTO,
arguing that isolated but otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is not patent-
eligible subject matter under the U.S. patent code.191 The briefs state that an
isolated gene is not a new and useful composition of matter, but instead,
genomic DNA is a product of nature and as such ineligible for patent pro-
tection.192 The briefs argue that methods of identifying, isolating, and using
such DNA molecules may be patented as well as new and useful alteration
of these molecules, provided they meet current patent standards for qualify-
ing as an invention.193 The intervention by the Solicitor General may have
encouraged the Supreme Court to accept the case and may have influenced
the nature of the decision it rendered.
The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 13, 2013, some four
years after the case was initially filed in the Federal District Court. A unani-
mous Court held that “[a] naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of
nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated.”194 Ac-
cording to the decision, “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas are basic tools of scientific and technological work that lie beyond the
domain of patent protection,”195 and the Myriad DNA claim falls within the
187. Id. at 1336–37.
188. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012)
(mem.).
189. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No.
2010-1406), 2012 WL 2884115.
190. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL
390999.
191. See Brief for the United States, supra note 189; Brief for the United States, supra note
190.
192. Brief for the United States, supra note 189, at *4; Brief for the United States, supra note
190, at *20–26.
193. Brief for the United States, supra note 189, at *6–8; Brief for the United States, supra
note 190, at *3.
194. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
195. Id. at 2116 (internal quotations omitted).
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law of nature exception.196 According to the decision, “Myriad’s principal
contribution was uncovering the precise location and genetic sequences of
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, [but] Myriad did not create or alter any of
the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes . . . [or]
the genetic structure of [the] DNA.”197 While the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that Myriad found an important and useful gene, it determined that a
groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the requirements of the patent code.198
This ruling has obvious implications for thousands of other claims on
naturally occurring DNA sequences, but some analysts believe the impact
will be relatively modest.199 According to this line of reasoning, the most
valuable biotechnology patents are not based on such naturally occurring
DNA sequences.200 Since 2005, fewer companies have sought to patent nat-
urally occurring gene sequences, while claims on DNA that has been engi-
neered have been on the rise.201 Some companies also found it more
difficult than expected to profit from these genetic patents.202 However, the
decision importantly expresses strident judicial opposition to patents on
methods claims for detecting genetic sequence alterations and thereby di-
minishes the prospects of Myriad or another company claiming monopolies
on a genetic diagnostic test without a linkage to a therapeutic agent or a
modification of DNA molecules.203
Complicating its decision, the Supreme Court also held that “comple-
mentary” or cDNA genetic sequences created by stripping away non-pro-
tein coding material from naturally occurring DNA can be patented.204 The
Court reasoned that a cDNA sequence constitutes “an exons-only molecule
that is not naturally occurring.”205 The Court’s split judgment has been crit-
icized by some analysts because cDNA itself can occur naturally.206 Others
have pointed out that the ruling that patents can be claimed on modified
DNA has confused and puzzled observers because it creates a “bizarre rheo-
stat about the amount of change that would need to take place chemically in
order to justify a patent.”207
196. Id. at 2117.
197. Id. at 2116.
198. Id. at 2117.
199. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Gene Patenting–The Supreme Court Finally Speaks, 369
NEW ENG. J. MED. 869, 873 (2013).
200. Robert Cook-Deegan, Law and Science Collide Over Human Gene Patents, 338 SCIENCE
745, 747 (2012).
201. Kesselheim et al., supra note 199, at 873.
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204. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 1229 (2013).
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206. John M. Golden & William Sage, Are Human Genes Patentable? The Supreme Court
Says Yes and No, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1343, 1345 (2013).
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In the end, the Supreme Court’s decision was rendered on narrow tech-
nical grounds ignoring the ethical, theological, policy, and human welfare
concerns that animated much of the opposition to patents. As one article
commented, “It is interesting that although the Supreme Court decision con-
cerns human genes, humanness had no bearing on the decision. Nor does
the law allow courts to consider whether patenting human genes—or any-
thing else—should be disallowed on grounds of morality.”208
G. Reflections
For years members of the religious community were lonely voices
“crying in the wilderness” about the problems with issuing human gene
patents. In doing so, they raised significant issues about the appropriateness
of patenting human genes and other life forms and its potential implications
for denigrating respect for life and human dignity, albeit often in an inade-
quate manner. The religious critics argued that to embark on a course of
promoting commercialization and privatization of biology without mean-
ingful public debate regarding the morality and wisdom of such acts consti-
tutes a violation of the implicit social contract between the government and
the governed in a democratic society. The religious community thus high-
lighted issues often neglected by secular critics.
However, at the same time the religious community neglected other
important issues. The religious community did not discuss the detrimental
impacts of genetic patents on scientific and medical research. Nor did it
take up the concerns so central to the plaintiffs in the Myriad case that the
willingness to extend life patents restricted the availability of needed ge-
netic testing and obstructed patient care. If it had done so, it might have
been possible for some religious actors to collaborate with secular critics.
In retrospect, the various communions that put forward positions
seemed to do so more as an act of witness than as a serious effort to influ-
ence the course of U.S. patent law. Their interventions were not timed to
coincide with, or react to, relevant initiatives in the patent field. Nor did
they refer to the specifics of patent law or to policies of the USPTO with
which they took issue. Instead the issues identified and the manner in which
those issues were addressed appear to be primarily symbolic. Moreover, the
religious witness on patenting fell far short of a well-formed public theol-
ogy. The religious actors could have offered a more careful theological and
ethical analysis with specific proposals without undermining the force of its
critique. It is particularly problematic that the one amicus brief filed on
behalf of a religious agency did not raise broader ethical issues, such as the
impact of genetic patents on human welfare and medical treatment.
John Evans contends that religious critics of patenting have been dis-
advantaged in the discussion of the issue because they are attempting to
208. Kesselheim et al., supra note 199, at 874.
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make a “prophetic” argument while supporters of the current patent regime
had the advantage of the status quo on their side.209 Evans characterizes the
prophetic approach as an effort to expose the roots of what is perceived to
be fundamentally and systematically right or wrong.210 However, opting for
a prophetic approach does not excuse imprecise and inadequate theological
and ethical reasoning.
Like the work of the religious community on some other issues, inter-
est in patenting has been intermittent, possibly because relevant staff per-
sons went on to other positions or because the denomination developed
other priorities. More thoughtful, informed, and in-depth reflections on pat-
enting issues written by individual ethicists and moral theologians, such as
the work of Ronald Cole-Turner and Ted Peters,211 were often reactions to
the positions taken in these acts of witness, particularly the Joint Appeal, or
were solicited through their participation in projects like the AAAS dia-
logue group and a similar group sponsored by The Hastings Center. So
although the religious community did make a contribution to the patenting
debate, it was less than it might have been.
When the Supreme Court made its landmark decision on the patenta-
bility of genes there was little religious involvement or reflection of its con-
cerns in the various briefs and positions of the litigants, with the exception
of the poorly written amicus brief filed on behalf of the Southern Baptist
Convention. It might have been otherwise.
209. See John H. Evans, The Uneven Playing Field of the Dialogue on Patenting, in PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 1, at 60–68.
210. Id. at 60–61.
211. See generally Cole-Turner, Theological Perspectives on the Status of DNA; A Contribu-
tion to the Debate over Genetic Patenting, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1 (arguing that a robust
understanding of divine ownership of nature can augment our understanding of human ownership
of nature); DNA and Human Dignity: A Response to Baruch Brody, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1
(arguing that the locus of human dignity extends beyond the genome).
